When the FBI Comes Calling…®
COUNTERFEITING AND FORGERY (continued)
18 U.S.C. § 471 (2005).
Whoever, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or alters any obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Case Law Interpreting Section 471
Completion and stamping of genuine blanks for Series E bonds, so as to give a counterfeit validity, is forgery of bonds under section 471 even though the blanks from which the defendant worked were genuine. United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
The dying and coloring of an obligation as one step in a fraud scheme to create realistic counterfeit currency are activities that could be found by a reasonable jury to constitute "alterations" within the scope of sections 471 and 472. United States v. Wabo, 290 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D.N.J. 2003).
There is no requirement to cross a state line as an element of violating section 471; a person who alters an obligation or other security of the United States is guilty of violating section 471. United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1973).
18 U.S.C. § 472 (2005).
Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States or keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Case Law Interpreting Section 472
A defendant who did not believe that he would defraud either the United States nor anyone in the United States was still convicted of violating section 472 when he sold counterfeit notes intending them to go to Mexico, because he knew somebody would ultimately be defrauded. United States v. Hagan, 487 F.2d 897, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1973).
The government must prove in a prosecution of section 472 that the defendant knew the bills were counterfeit and that he had a general intent to defraud unknown third parties with those bills. United States v. Pitts, 508 F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1974). Because these essential elements are often difficult to prove with direct evidence, a jury in the usual case can rely on circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether the requisite mental condition exists. Id.
Merely passing a counterfeit bill is not an offense; the government must prove that the defendant knew the bill to be bogus, and intend to pass bad money. United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 299 (9th Cir. 1978). Like in Pitts, intent can be inferred. Id.
The passing of an instrument is putting it off or giving it in payment or exchange; uttering an instrument is a declaration that it is good, or offer to pass it as good. Merely showing it, without an offer to pass it, or merely depositing it, is not uttering it. To convict a defendant for uttering or passing, he must have been present at the act, but if he delivers the instrument to a servant, to be sent to a customer, or if he is sufficiently near the person who utters or passes it with his privity to give his assistance, or acts his part, or does any thing connected with uttering or passing, party accused is considered as present. A note is uttered when it is delivered for purpose of being passed. United States v. Wolfe, 307 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1962).